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COURTS OF LAST RESORT.
In America courts of last resort occupy a unique position. Our
written constitutions distribute the powers of government among
three departments: the legislative; the executive, and the judicial.
Who shall determine the limits of the jurisdiction of these several
departments? This question is not answered in express words in
any of our constitutions. It was answered, however, at a very
early date by .Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Supreme
Court of the United, States in the celebrated case of Marbury v.
Madison. In that case Marshall held that in deciding a con-
troversy according to law, the judiciary-the court of last resort
-was bound to apply the higher law found in the Constitution,
rather than an opposing law enacted by the legiilative depart-
ment, and consequently to declare unconstitutional, null and void
the conflicting legislative enactment. It followed from this de-
cision and this reasoning that any wrong caused by the legislative
department of government exceeding its constitutional limitations
could be redressed by the judiciary-by the courts of last resort;
and that any wrong committed by the executive department of
government in exceeding its constitutional limitations could like-
wise be redressed by those courts. It also followed from this
decision that there was no constitutional means of obtaining re-
dress for a wrong committed by courts of last resort in exceed-
ing their jurisdiction. This decision made the judiciary, as has
well been said, the keystone of the arch of government.
Many eminent lawyers denied the correctness of Marshall's
opinion. Some eminent lawyers today doubt its correctness.
The Constitution, it is said, makes each of the departments of
government independent and equal. The decision, it is said,
destroyed this equality. It made the judiciary, represented by
the court of last resort supreme-the executive and the legis-
lative departments of government subordinate. Whether Mar-
shall's opinion was or was not correct-that is, whether he placed
upon the Constitution the construction intended by those who
framed it-is a question which it would be idle to discuss, for
that construction has been universally accepted. It was a wise
construction. It furnished a constitutional tribunal to determine
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every question which might arise. It lessened-perhaps it
banished-the danger of disruption of government arising from
differences between opposing factions. The principle of this de-
cision was not confined to its application to the national govern-
ment. It applied with full force to the government of the several
States. This has been universally recognized. It may be said,
therefore, that as the Supreme Court of the United States is the
keystone of the arch of the Federal government, so likewise the
court of last resort of each State is the keystone of the arch of
the government of that State.
It will be observed that this paramount authority of the judi-
ciary rests upon the proposition that it is the duty of the judi-
ciary to determine controversies according to the law; and the
possession of this extraordinary authority has never endangered
the rights of a free people, because the only way that it could be
exercised was by determining controversies according to law.
All our Constitutions, both Federal and State, may then be read
as if they contained the provision: Upon the faith that our court
of last resort will determine controversies according to law, we,
the people, grant it supreme authority. Faith that our courts of
last resort will determine controversies according to law is then
the rock upon which our governments are built. That courts of
last resort must determine controversies according to law is the
most elementary of legal principles. This is almost the first
principle learned by every lawyer, and this means every judge.
Yet it is a principle which should be emphasized and re-em-
phasized, for it should never be lost to view. It should always
be appreciated. It is not always appreciated. I will say nothing
derogatory of judges. If there is any one who believes that
judges never fail to appreciate this fundamental truth, I am
immensely pleased, and I will not attempt to destroy his faith.
Certain it is that lawyers do not always appreciate it. If they
did, they would not, as they often do, urge considerations calcu-
lated to incite feelings of sympathy and prejudice, and thereby
hide from the view of the courts the legal questions involved.
Nor would they seek to justify such conduct by saying if I can
succeed in convincing the judge of the merits of my client's case,
I will take my chances on the law. With this conduct on the
part of intelligent lawyers, it should not surprise us that laymen
should have obscure views on this question. It should not sur-
prise us that at times they should in scathing terms condemn and
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denounce a judge for deciding a controversy in which they are
interested in accordance with law and opposed to their ideas of
justice. It is impossible to believe that the man who utters such
denunciation and condemnation understands the fundamental
truth which I have tried to enunciate. It cannot be that he
understands that judges are bound by the most sacred oath to
decide controversies according to law; that faith that he should
so decide them is the most fundamental of constitutional prin-
ciples; that men cannot be accorded equal rights and privileges
unless those rights and privileges are all measured by the com-
mon standard-the standard furnished by the law. He who
appreciates this truth cannot fail to see that any effort made to
induce courts of last resort to disregard the law in deciding con-
troversies is an effort to overthrow constitutional govern-
ment. I plead not for the execration of the man who makes that
effort, but for his enlightenment. He should be made to ap-
preciate the truth. Every citizen should be made to appreciate it.
A greater endeavor should therefore be made to teach that truth.
It should become a popular truth.
It may be asked, what difference does it make that a judge is
denounced for faithfully performing the duty reposed in him
by the people? His duty is none the less clear. He has no choice.
He must perform it. He must say, as Chief Justice Marshall
said in a similar case:
"No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable
situation. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject
of calumny. No man, might he let the bitter cup pass from
him without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But
if he have no choice in the case, if there be no alternative pre-
sented to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of
those who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt
as well as the indignation of his country who can hesitate which
to embrace."
It is none the less a lamentable situation if judges of courts
of last resort feel that they cannot decide a controversy accord-
ing to law without losing the popular favor which alone insures
their continuance in office. If such a situation confronts a judge,
let us hope that he will conduct himself according to the pre-
cepts of Marshall. Every one of us can recall instances of
judges who have so conducted themselves, and who have been
made martyrs because they did their duty. But the people have
no right to subject their judges to any such strain, and if they do,
it is to be feared that some of them will not stand the test.
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It often happens that the judge who fearlessly performs his
duty in disregard of what he believes to be the will of his con-
stituents finds that he has increased instead of diminished his
popularity. And I think, too, that it sometimes happens that the
judge who shamelessly disregards his duty in compliance with
what he believes to be the will of his constituents finds that he
has lost instead of increased his popularity. Each of these men
believed he was making the supreme sacrifice. One, the sacrifice
of his life to preserve his honor; the other the sacrifice of his
honor to preserve his life. Happily for the perpetuity of Amer-
ican institutions, each found himself mistaken. By losing his
life for the sake of duty, the one found it. By saving his life
at the expense of duty, the other lost it. These experiences
prove as nothing else can the capacity of the American people
for self-government. There is an obligation on the part of the
judge to decide controversies according to law. There is an
obligation on the part of the people to respect him for the per-
formance of his duty. In general it may be said that the people
will keep the faith.
The whole duty of courts of last resort, then, is to decide the
controversies brought before them according to law. To decide
a controversy according to law, the court must perform two
duties: first, it must understand the facts so that the real issue
is clearly perceived. Second, it must find, state and apply to
the determination of that issue the true rule of law. There is a
possibility of the court's making a mistake in performing each
of these duties. The consequences are more serious if the mis-
take is made in the performance of the latter duty, for then
not only is an erroneous decision made in the particular case,
but a precedent is set which affects the rights and duties of every
one in the State. Judging from my limited experience as a mem-
ber of a court of last resort, the mistake most frequently com-
mitted, however, is a failure to understand the case; a miscon-
ception of the controlling issue, resulting not, it is true, in un-
settling the law, but none the less in an erroneous decision. This
consequence is, however, serious enough, for I imagine it would
afford little consolation to a defeated suitor to be told that the
erroneous decision which denied him his right left the rights of
his neighbors unimpaired.
Whenever an erroneous decision pronounced by courts of last
resort arises from a failure to understand the case, the office of
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the argument of counsel has not been performed, for whatever
else that argument should do, it should correctly analyze the
facts and clearly point out the controlling issue. I think prac-
ticing lawyers would be surprised if they knew how often argu-
ments of counsel fail to perform this important service. I am
willing to concede that the reason for this failure is sometimes
to be found in the inattention of the judges who constitute the
court. It must be confessed that judges sometimes do not under-
stand the argument of counsel simply because they do not give
it proper attention. I think, however, that it may be said as a
general proposition that the failure of courts of last resort to
understand a case is chargeable to the imperfect argument of
counsel. In their anxiety to achieve a victory, counsel yield to
the temptation of stating the facts from the point of view most
favorable to their client's interest. Frequently they undertake
to state their case in such a way as to appeal to the supposed
sympathy or prejudice of the judges and to blind them to the
legal questions involved. More often they bring into prominence
immaterial facts which they think disclose equities in their client's
favor. They place an undue emphasis upon certain material
facts, overlooking other essential facts and thus contend for a
decision in their client's favor upon an issue which is not the
true issue in controversy. In all such cases-and such cases are
altogether too numerous-the court of last resort must, without
the aid of counsel, discover the true issue and the principle by
which it is to be decided. It is not surprising that the court thus
compelled to perform the duty of both judge and counsel should
sometimes fail to perform one or the other-perhaps both-of
these duties. There might be some justice in holding that counsel
who improperly place the court in this dilemma are estopped from
making any complaint.
The question arises, what can be done to remedy this griev-
ance? Of course, the most obvious remedy is open to counsel.
They should correct their practice. They should state the facts
clearly and above all, fairly. Instead of endeavoring, as many of
them do, to place a construction upon the facts most favorable to
their client's interest, they should do their utmost to construe them
as they should be construed by a fair-minded judge. I am aware
that many lawyers will say: "I owe a duty to my client to win
this controversy; that duty justifies the practice you condemn."
This is taking too narrow a view of our profession and
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of our professional obligations. We have no right to make
the winning of suits the supreme object of our profes-
sional career. We should be faithful to every duty we owe
our client, but we should never forget that we owe duties to
society and to ourselves. These latter duties are paramount. Our
client has a right to expect that we will do all that an honest
lawyer can to win his controversy. He has, however, no right
to ask us to do more. If his suit cannot be won by honest
endeavor, it should not be won at all. We have no right to over-
state his case, we have no right to mis-state his case, because we
have no right to try to deceive the court. -Nor is it true that
the practice under consideration renders valuable service to our
clients. A lawyer is not serving his client by advancing an argu-
ment based on a misconception of the testimony; an argument
which must crumble with the foundation upon which it rests. In
that case he presents no argument for his client. He neglects his
client's interests. He injures rather than benefits him. Indeed,
I believe it may be said generally that a lawyer renders his client
most efficient service when he serves him with an enlightened
conscience. I think it may also be said that their lack of fair-
mindedness explains why so many lawyers of the greatest ability
fail to attain the highest place in our profession.
I think, too, that the judges constituting the court can do
something to remedy this evil. If they can prove by their
decisions that they are never misled by improper statements, they
will do much to discourage it. There is no doubt that they are
sometimes misled, and this circumstance affords the only ade-
quate explanation for the fact that some lawyers of high rank
persist in a reprehensible practice.
An attentive attitude on the part of judges will do much
to encourage lawyers to make fair statements and proper argu-
ments. Lawyers will hesitate to make erroneous statements to
watchful, attentive and trustful judges. When a lawyer sees
that he is receiving the undivided attention of an intelligent,
honest, fair-minded judge, he will endeavor to merit the con-
fidence he is receiving. Such attention, it must be confessed
he does not always receive. It must be admitted that judges
sometimes do not closely attend to the arguments that are
addressed to them. No one can justify this, but there is some
excuse for it.
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While most of the arguments addressed to a court afford aid
in reaching a correct decision, it cannot be said that all of them
do. Sometimes those arguments-so-called arguments-are mere
aggregation of words, emanating from the mouth of a lawyer
determined to use every minute of the time given him by the
rules of the court. The judge who can sleep in the daytime is
to be envied in such a case. He can escape what his wakeful
and more unfortunate associate must endure. It is unnecessary
to state that a judge is not attentive to such an argument. If you
think he is, you are deceived. That, however, is a matter of
little consequence, for nothing could be gained by such attention.
The serious consequence is that such experiences are often re-
peated, almost certain to create a habit of inattention-a habit
that may persist when arguments should be listened to atten-
tively. It is not true, as was once said by a waggish friend of
mine, that he can always identify a member of a court of last
resort by the vacant expression of his countenance. If, how-
ever, it were true, the experience I have described explains, if
it does not justify it. Of course, we will all agree that the
judges should correct their habit of inattention and do their
utmost in every way to get a clear conception of the issue in con-
troversy. They then reach the more important duty of de-
claring the law which controls that issue. They must bring to
the discharge of this duty all the highest judicial qualities-
integrity, learning, wisdom, courage, industry and above all else,
fairmindedness. Their commission from the people authorizes
them to declare the law applicable to the decision of the contro-
versy, but it does not authorize them to declare law that is not
applicable to that decision. If they do that, they usurp an
authority that has never been given them.
The successors of these judges when called upon to decide a
controversy in which the supposed principle is applicable possess
the undoubted and sole authority to determine its correctness.
Moreover, without the aid afforded by the actual controversy, the
court lacks one of the necessary elements to a correct determin-
ation of the controlling legal principle. For, by its application
to an actual controversy, the justice of that principle can be
tested. Though this test is not the only one which should be
applied, it is one which can never be safely omitted. So it often
happens that when judges state a legal principle inapplicable to
the case under consideration, they state it incorrectly. It may
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be said that this mistake is not irremediable, because such a state-
ment is not a precedent binding on the court; the court having
entire liberty to repudiate it upon the ground that it is an obiter
dictum. But I am persuaded that courts should take greater care
than they do to guard against such mistakes. Even though they
are subsequently corrected, their commission tends to weaken pub-
lic confidence in the courts that committed them; and the conse-
quence of such a mistake is sometimes disastrous. The repu-
tation of Chief Justice Taney acquired by a long life of useful-
ness and fidelity was almost destroyed by his decision in the
celebrated Dred Scot case. It is true that the principles of that
decision were detested by a majority of Americans and they
believed them to be incorrect, but the reputation of this eminent
jurist would not have seriously suffered had they not been per-
suaded that these principles were inapplicable to the controversy
under consideration. Faith in him was lost because it was be-
lieved-I think erroneously believed-that he took advantage of
his position to declare a law which he had no authority to declare.
The question arises, what is this law by which controversies
are to be determined? Part of that law is in writing-commands
made by the people themselves or by those to whom they have
delegated authority to make laws. As to this part, it may be
emphatically stated, the law applied by the court is the law made
by the people. But this part is a very small part indeed of the
law applied by the courts in determining controversies. Nearly
all the law so applied is unwritten law. The written law, as has
well been said, is only "the fringe upon the body of the law," and
after its consideration, we have not answered the question, what
is the law by which controversies are determined?
Every lawyer should read and re-read Mr. James C. Carter's
excellent book, entitled Law, Its Origin, Growth and Functions.
That book throws great light on the question, What is the law?
and, at least, materially contributes to its correct answer. Who-
ever reads that book intelligently and diligently, though he may
not entirely agree with" Mr. Carter, will, I believe, be convinced
that the law applied by the court in determining controversies is
the same law which regulates human conduct. The ordinary in-
dividual in his every day affairs regulates his conduct by the
same law which the court applies in determining controversies.
The man of affairs in deciding what course he will pursue to
advance his own interest and at the same time to avoid injury to
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his neighbor, is engaged in the same process that the court is
engaged in when it determines a controversy involving a similar
question. Each is making a decision according to the law which
regulates human conduct. What is the law which regulates
human conduct? That is a question which I do not believe the
wisest man in the world can correctly answer. That is the ques-
tion the courts are constantly striving to answer, but which they
have not yet answered. While we know some of the principles
of this law, we do not know all of them-perhaps we do not know
its fundamental principle. We can say, however, that it is the
law by which a people advance from the lowest and most de-
graded savagery to the highest civilization-to a civilization
higher and more splendid than today is dreamed of. Who made
this law? Certainly the courts did not make it. No one ever
consciously made it. "It is," says Mr. Carter, "the form in
which human conduct-that is, human life, presents itself under
the necessary operation of the causes which govern conduct." It
is, I add, in the highest sense, the people's law. Courts of last
resort alone possess official authority to declare this law. They
possess that authority because the people have given it to them.
They declare it, as has heretofore been stated, by applying it in
deciding a controversy. This declaration is not the law, but it is
considered the highest and best evidence of the law. We call
it a precedent. It is considered the best evidence of the law
because it is ascertained by the best method human ingenuity
has been able to devise. If the law so declared is correctly de-
clared; that is, if it really is a rule which regulates human eon-
duct, the court of last resort has rendered a most beneficent ser-
vice, for it is of the utmost importance that the people should
know the law which regulates their conduct-the law by which
they advance toward a higher civilization. As by knowing the
law of health, people preserve and prolong their lives, so, by
knowing the law which regulates their conduct, they make more
certain and speedier progress toward their destined-their
glorious-end.
This knowledge will contribute to our material, moral- and
also, I believe, to our spiritual upliftment.
Heretofore I endeavored to emphasize the truth, that faith
that courts will determine controversies according to law is the
foundation of American government. I now emphasize a truth
far more important. Upon this same faith must rest-in part
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at least--our hope of advancing toward a higher civilization-
our hope of making material, moral and spiritual progress.
But what if courts do not determine controversies according
to law? Suppose that instead of correctly declaring the law,
they declare it incorrectly: suppose they make a mistake in
declaring the rule which regulates human conduct, and that
human conduct instead of being regulated by the rule declared
is regulated by an opposing rule? Human conduct will in that
case be regulated by its own law and not by the declaration of the
court. And this decision must sooner or later-the sooner the
better-be repudiated by the courts. Fortunately, the court by
declaring an incorrect rule, does not materially retard human
progress, because, as already said, our conduct will be regulated
by its own law and not by the rule incorrectly declared. By de-
claring an incorrect rule, the court merely misses an opportunity
of advancing human progress. Judges sometimes take them-
selves too seriously. They fear they will change the law if they
incorrectly declare it. Of course, they should take every care to
correctly declare it. But if a collision occurs between their
declaration and the law, the law does not suffer; they suffer.
If any one can prove that the law declared in a judicial de-
cision is not in harmony with human conduct, he should not keep
silent. While it is the duty of every one to uphold the judge who
decides a case according to law, it is equally the duty of every
one to criticise a decision which is not according to law. But the
extent or severity of this criticism does not afford the test of the
correctness of the law so declared. That test is afforded not by
the voice of the people, but by their conduct. The test is not
whether the rule is popular or unpopular, but whether human
conduct is in fact regulated by it. If, by acting in accordance
with this rule, we advance toward a higher civilization, it is the
law. That is the test. If it does not stand this test, it is not the
law.
There are two sources from which courts of last resort get the
law which controls conduct-the law by which they determine
controversies. One of these sources is (to quote from Mr. Car-
ter), "a study of conduct and consequence," and by applying in
this study principles of reasoning approved by the common judg-
ment of mankind. This is the source from which individuals get
the law by which they determine their conduct. When a judge
gets his law from this source, he is said to be deciding a case on
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principle, or according to the rule of common sense. The other
source from which a court of last resort gets the law is from
decisions made by itself or by other courts of last resort. When
the law is taken from this source, a court is said to be deciding a
case upon precedent. It is unsafe for a judge to neglect either of
these sources.
The judge who deduces his law entirely from precedent-who,
in other words, is a slave to precedent-is the most inefficient of
judges. He will delay the decision of the most unimportant
question until he finds a case in point. Having no vision of the
fundamental principles 6f the law, he is almost certain to
ridiculously misapply the precedent and thus reach a decision
erroneous and often absurd.
On the other hand, the judge who never looks at authorities,
who has-as he ofen says-a contempt for precedents, but who
possesses a vigorous intelligence and sound understanding and
decides all cases according to the rule of common sense, will
decide the great majority of them correctly, but some of them,
he will decide incorrectly. He will decide the majority of these
cases correctly, because they are simple cases controlled by some
principle of elementary law. He will decide others incorrectly
because they are not simple and because they are controlled by a
principle of law which can be discovered only by the aid of great
wisdom and extraordinary powers of reasoning.
This wisdom and this power of reasoning were possessed by
many of the great judges and used by them in making their
decisions. The judge who decides difficult cases without exam-
ining these decisions, refuses to look at the light. He refuses
to get his law from the best source. By implication, he asserts
his superiority to all these great judges who have gone before
him. He would be convinced if he studied their decisions that
their united wisdom exceeded his.
The truth is that to decide the law with even approximate
accuracy, a judge must be neither a slave nor an enemy of pre-
cedent. He must be a master of precedent and he must also
be a diligent student of human conduct and its consequences,
possessing a logical mind, able to reason correctly.
The decisions of courts of last resort must, at least, according
to our American notions, be in written form. This is done for
the double purpose of insuring accuracy-for writing is a great
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aid to exactness-and also that the world may know the rule of
law delared and applied. Extraordinary care should be used in
the preparation of these opinions. They should contain a state-
ment of the facts essential to a clear understanding of the issue
involved. Every other fact should be omitted. They should
contain a clear statement of the rule applied to the controversy,
and they should contain nothing else.
It is a mistake to attempt to discuss every proposition urged
by counsel; if the proposition is manifestly frivolous; if it is
based upon an erroneous conception of the record, or if it is
answered by elementary principles of law, the opinion is dis-
figured by its consideration. Its discussion tends to conceal other
and possibly important principles decided. Opinions should be
appropriate to the case. If there is involved no important prin-
ciple, no opportunity is presented for a great opinion, and judges
make a great mistake if they attempt to write one. My limited
experience as a member of a court of last resort, convinces me
that the great majority of cases present no important question.
Many of them are chancery cases where the controlling issue de-
pends upon the credibility of witnesses. In such cases, I think
the court does its full duty when it contents itself with the state-
ment that it gives credit to certain testimony. I think it is a mis-
take to undertake to state why that credit is given. In many
cases the only issue presented is determined by a construction of
the record. In those cases all that the opinion can do is to state
its proper construction. Many other cases are determined by the
application of principles of elementary law about which there is
not the slightest question. I doubt if it is wise to publish any of
these opinions in the report.
Courts should not be unduly solicitous to write opinions that
will be convincing. Arguments designed to convince are often
selected from considerations of a temporary and transitory nature.
They are out of place in a record designed to be permanent. And
though these arguments silence adverse criticism and make the
opinion popular, they have little tendency to establish its correct-
ness. Its correctness, as I have heretofore endeavored to prove,
is to be tested by its application to human conduct.
Seldom is the judge of a court of last resort given the oppor-
tunity to write a great opinion. This is most fortunate. That
opportunity may come, however, and if it comes, it comes un-
heralded. It may be found that in some meager record, poorly
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briefed, there is presented for decision an issue which requires
the declaration and application of a rule of law never before
discovered. It may be in a case which must be decided without
precedent; it may be in a case which must be decided in opposi-
tion to all precedent. No judge should crave such a task; no
judge should shrink from the responsibility of performing it.
If it comes, he should pray that he may be equal to his opportu-
nity; that he may contribute to the advancement of humanity
by ,correctly declaring the law.
William L. Carpenter.
